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(August 10, 2021, 9:38 a.m.)
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         DEPUTY CLERK: Court calls Waco 6:20-CV-881, styled Sonos,
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    Inc. versus Google LLC for a Markman hearing.
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         THE COURT: If I could have announcements from counsel,
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    please.
         MR. SIEGMUND: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Mark
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    Siegmund for plaintiff Sonos, Inc. With me today is Cole
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    Richter, Rory Shea, Dan Smith, Sean Sullivan, Michael Boyea and
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    Jae Pak with the law firm of Lee Sullivan Shea & Smith LLP.
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         Mr. Richter, Shea, Smith and Boyea will be the main
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    speakers today, Your Honor.
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         THE COURT: Okay.
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         MR. BURBANK: Good morning, Your Honor. Stephen Burbank
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    with Scott Douglass & McConnico for Google. With me are
15
    co-counsel Charles Verhoeven, Jordan Jaffe and Marc Kaplan, all
16
    from Ouinn Emanuel.
         Also with us is our in-house counsel, Patrick Weston.
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    Mr. Verhoeven, Mr. Jaffe and Mr. Kaplan will be handling the
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    arguments for Google.
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                     Well, it sounds like we have an all-star cast,
    and I appreciate in-house counsel and clients for attending. I
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    also always enjoy having law clerks on competing sides. Always
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    good to see former law clerks attend these hearings.
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         So let me pull up -- give me one second. The first claim
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    term that we have is "multimedia."
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Who will be taking this one up?

MR. RICHTER: I believe that will be me, Your Honor. Cole Richter on behalf of Sonos.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. RICHTER: And actually, you know, Your Honor, before we jump into some of the constructions, I was hoping to cover a couple of preliminary issues that apply to all the claim terms, if you'll permit me.

First, in reviewing some of the Markman transcripts from your other cases, Your Honor, we understand and we want to confirm on the record that our decision to argue certain things but not other things will not be held against us and that Sonos is preserving all the arguments made in the briefs and are not waiving any arguments on appeal regarding claim construction.

Did I get that right, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Well, let me just say this. I don't know what you mean by "be held against you." As far as I'm concerned, it's perfectly okay with me to -- for the parties to select which ones -- you've taken your position in all the papers, and I think those, on appeal, that -- but I'm not the Federal Circuit, and they wouldn't have ever let me appear in front of the Federal Circuit, but my sense is you all have those arguments.

What we do at the Markman hearing is, you all simply decide which ones you think are worthy of having additional

advocacy and have me decide.

But, for example, if there was a preliminary construction I gave with which your client disagreed with, as far as I'm concerned, the fact that you didn't argue it today doesn't mean -- doesn't mean it's not preserved. It just means you felt like it would be better -- the way I see it is, you thought your client would be better served by arguing other claim terms.

That's the way I see it. And I think that's -- you're absolutely right. I think that whatever you've argued in your papers, you've taken that position for purposes of appeal.

MR. RICHTER: Thank you, Your Honor.

Second, in the hopes of reducing some of the disputes before the Court today, I want to raise just a quick point of clarification on Your Honor's preliminary constructions.

So for the terms where, for example, Sonos proposed the construction and the Court, in its preliminary construction, said plain and ordinary meaning and those terms, for example, are "multimedia," "network interface," "playback device/zone player," "local area network," "data network," we understand --

THE COURT: All words that have plain and ordinary meaning that anyone would -- that anyone, even my 19 and 20-year-old would know. And I was going to get into that, but you go first, then I'm going to have some comments.

MR. RICHTER: Okay. No problem. No problem.

Yeah. I just wanted to seek this clarification.

So we understand that the Court's preliminary construction of plain and ordinary meaning is an indication that the Court believes that no construction is necessary at this time and that Sonos would not be precluded from asserting at a later time, for example, in a summary judgment motion or pretrial proceeding, that the plain and ordinary meaning of these terms as understood in the context of the patents-in-suit is the construction that Sonos is now proposing.

And if that understanding is correct, then Sonos will not present any argument at the hearing today against the Court's preliminary construction of plain and ordinary meaning for those terms and instead would reserve arguments.

THE COURT: You're absolutely right. But let me -- you're right, and I'm not -- but here's the way I see the world.

My -- in none of these situations was I saying that the proposed construction was incorrect and rejecting it.

And typically -- not typically, always when I -- if I'm making that determination where someone has said, it's got to be X, and I think that that's not right, I put that on the record. That's not the situation here.

But here, let me frame it a little differently, and I was going to tell you all this anyway. The way I see the world, for better or worse for you all, is, when someone's drafting a patent and they use the word "zone," now, if the patent has to

do with zones and they are patenting something that has to do with zones and saying, my zone is different than an ordinary zone and here's why, and they claim something or they say something in the spec or they say something during the prosecution history to get the word "zone" allowed and they give up something, that's a different deal.

But in situations like this, where, you know, all the words, all the terms that you said, "multimedia," "network interface," "zone," "group configuration," especially "local area network," "data network," where when the person is writing the patent and he's just acting as one skilled in the art to interface with the Patent Office and he uses those claim terms, then it's plain and ordinary meaning and I don't swerve from that.

However, if for -- here's -- it's not a perfect analogy, but here's what I try and get across to people. Let's say that you have invented a way of -- a method of installing Astroturf in a baseball field and the magic of the patent is that a baseball outfield is curved, and you come up with a method that -- part of which is on a field that is curved. And that's all you -- you used the word "curved," which everyone knows what the word "curved" means.

If someone comes in and wants to apply it to, let's say, a soccer field or a football field, the word "curved," that's not the plain and ordinary meaning. Those are 90-degree angles.

But if someone wants to come in and say, well, it's -there's only a 2 percent degree curve, that's not enough curve.
That's not curved. To me, curved then has a plain and ordinary
meaning.

And again, assuming nothing was given up and nothing was claimed and nothing in the specification, curved means curved.

And when we get to the jury in this case and your person is saying that defendant's products have plain and ordinary meaning for "local area network," the only way either side is in trouble is if the expert takes such a greedy interpretation of local area network that I can decide as a matter of law that it either is or isn't a local area network.

And you can bring that to me after the final infringement contentions, you can bring it to me after the expert reports, or someone -- or you can come in and say, the other side's -- the other side or their expert is not applying the ordinary meaning of this word.

Again, I use the word "curved" because I think a jury can understand, and as a factual matter, what is or is not curved.

But if you all have a fight, that's a true fight, over what the plain and ordinary meaning is of claim terms like "zone," then I want you to -- I want the parties to be in concrete on the positions they're -- legal positions they're taking with regard to infringement and invalidity, bring them to me -- motions -- I'm talking to you, but I'm talking to both

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sides -- bring them to me as a preliminary summary judgment
matter, and I will determine whether or not that's appropriate.

MR. RICHTER: Okay. Thank you very much for that, Your
Honor.

And with that, Sonos can forego argument on many of the
terms. Actually, the terms that were given the plain and
ordinary indication in the Court's e-mail. And Sonos would
then instead argue the two terms that had a preliminary
construction of indefinite, and that would be "cause a
selectable indication" -- sorry. Go ahead, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you for a second. I'll
ask Mr. Burbank or Mr. Verhoeven, or whoever it is: Having
heard what counsel just said, does the defendant wish, on any
of the claim terms -- we're going to get to the ones about
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indefinite.

MR. VERHOEVEN: Well, Your Honor, this is Mr. Verhoeven.

Let's just take an example of the phrase "network interface."

Your Honor construed that to have its plain and ordinary

meaning.

whether or not it's indefinite, but with regard to the claim

terms that Sonos is not going to take up with respect to plain

and ordinary meaning, does the defendant have any desire to be

heard on any of those claim terms? If not, we'll move forward

to the ones that -- where the argument is that they're

We have a dispute right now because the plaintiff in this

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case, Sonos, wants to limit network interface to only digital
networks and not all networks. And we've said that we disagree
with that construction and the plain and ordinary meaning
should apply, which is all networks, digital or analog.
     Your Honor said plain and ordinary meaning in the
construction. So here's an example of one where we know we
disagree with what they're proposing.
     THE COURT: Well, you actually have -- you've actually
made my point. Right now I have -- right now I've said it's
plain and ordinary meaning. If when you get their final
infringement contentions or when you get -- when you get --
when they are in concrete -- when either they have taken a
position on infringement contentions or in their expert report
where they attempt to limit it in the manner that you say, you
are free to file a motion for summary judgment and say to me,
Judge, that's not -- they are not applying the plain and
ordinary meaning as a matter of law, and I will take that up
and I will decide it.
     MR. VERHOEVEN: Okay. Well, with that, that's great, Your
Honor. And it's good to know. I appreciate your telling us
that in the beginning.
     THE COURT: Because right now your concern is -- I've had
a couple Markmans now. And by the way --
     (Laughter.)
     THE COURT: By the way, it's wonderful. I haven't seen
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you, I don't think, since we were standing in Judge Sparks' courtroom a very long time ago.

But here's the problem I have -- I encounter a lot. You come in here -- not you you. But a party comes in here and says, we know from their preliminary infringement contentions they're going to say this. That doesn't matter either to me at this point. They're preliminary.

And also, I choose to remain ignorant with regard to a position they're taking about whether or not it's plain and ordinary meaning.

Now, once you have their final contentions and once you have an expert saying you guys infringe -- Google infringes, it has X term, and you can come in and say, as a matter of law, they're wrong, that's not the plain and ordinary meaning of this term, now you're stuck and they're stuck.

And then I'm actually going to look at the -- at what their expert says. But again, my only wiggle room here is, again, on a word, for example, like "circular," where I think a jury could determine whether or not the plain and ordinary meaning is a very slight curvature of the fence or if it has to be an ice cream cone-looking thing, I think a jury can handle that because I think it's a pretty normal word.

But on something where you think -- not you you. But where a party thinks that if they take this position on infringement as a matter of law that cannot be the plain and

ordinary meaning, you're welcome to file a motion for summary judgment.

And let me add this to it for the lawyers. We have a few things going on here. If you file something like that, just — it doesn't offend me at all. In fact, I encourage it. Let us know that you have filed something that is kind of a gating issue like that, that needs to be resolved sooner rather than later, and ask for a hearing and — as quickly as it's briefed, and we can take it up — I'll take it up, because I want — I don't want you all to get to trial and say, Judge, you know, we filed this motion eight months ago and we're here at trial.

I mean, if you think you've got a -- either side has a motion for summary judgment that something is not plain and ordinary meaning, then bring it and I will take that up in advance. And the jury -- if I think that's right, the jury's not going to take that up.

MR. VERHOEVEN: Thank you very much, Your Honor. That's very helpful.

THE COURT: I mean, I don't know if any other judge does it that way. But I've found that that's the best way, with the cases I'm dealing with, to do it.

So if there's a better way, you all are free to tell me. But so far, this has worked pretty well for me.

And by the way, I mean, I have -- you know, it gets no press, and maybe it shouldn't, but I don't think I've had a

trial yet, a patent trial, go where I haven't granted either a summary judgment or a Daubert on something.

So, I mean, I take -- I'm just saying, I take these motions very seriously. You're not going to get here and I'm going to say, oh, they take too long to do, just go to trial.

I think it's very important, the way I do things at this stage, to actually rule if you all bring me a motion that is as a matter of law. But just let us know when it's filed so we can get it taken up in due course.

MR. VERHOEVEN: Thank you very much, Your Honor. That's really helpful information.

THE COURT: So now that -- so having heard that, is there anything specifically on any of the claim terms that are plain and ordinary meaning that you'd like to take up before we move -- and you're welcome to -- before we move to the issues of indefiniteness at least with "zone configuration" and "group configuration" and also "causing a selectable indication"?

MR. VERHOEVEN: So, Your Honor, the one term that comes to mind for me is "zone scene," which Your Honor did provide a construction for.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. VERHOEVEN: So we would want to argue that one.

THE COURT: Let me -- so if you think that you have an argument and the other side doesn't, you can go ahead and go now.

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         Well, I'll just do that anyway. You can go ahead and
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    let's take up "zone scene," which is s-c-e-n-e, for the court
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    reporter. And you take it up, and then I'll hear from
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    plaintiff's counsel after you finish.
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         But if you'll give me just two seconds, I'm out-of-pocket
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    here, I need to grab a pen real quick. I'll be right back.
 7
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Sure. And can we get the slides up while
 8
    His Honor's doing that?
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         THE COURT: I'm ready when you are, sir.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
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         THE COURT: Can you all see me still?
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         (Clarification by the reporter.)
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         (Off-the-record discussion.)
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Verhoeven.
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                                                             So is
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    it correct that you cannot see the slides?
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         THE COURT: I can see the slides.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: Oh, you can see the slides.
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         THE COURT: Yes, sir. I can.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: Then may I go ahead and proceed?
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         THE COURT: Yes, sir. Absolutely.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: Can we go to Slide 6, please?
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         So this "zone scene" I want to argue, Your Honor. So I'm
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    putting up just an illustration of a zone first. Your Honor
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    said the phrase "zone" doesn't need to be construed, it should
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    be given its plain and ordinary meaning.
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And here's just an illustration of a zone. We all know, it's an area. It's a zone where you have these speakers.

That's not what the invention is in these three patents in this case. That's in the prior art. So this patent doesn't claim to have invented zones for the purpose of listening to music that was already in the art.

So let's go to zone scene, Slide 9, please.

So here, Your Honor, is the competing constructions, at least as initially set out in the process where we had the disclosure of constructions. And Google felt that a construction was necessary, Sonos initially said a construction is not necessary.

The reason we propose a construction, Your Honor, is because we need to give -- this patent adds as an innovation, as the claimed innovation, the notion of a zone scene being something different from a zone.

And the dispute here, Your Honor, is: Does a zone scene require something more than just a zone; and if so, what?

And our argument is a zone scene, they've added the word "scene," and that has to be given meaning. And if you look through the intrinsic evidence, it's very clear that the patentee meant scene to mean the same thing as a theme, a scene or a theme.

And maybe we just go with plain and ordinary meaning, Your Honor, but it has to be a scene or a theme. If you read that

out of the phrase "zone scene," then, in our view, that's error because scene is not given any meaning. It's just the same as zone. So that's the dispute here.

If you go to the next slide, please.

Now, importantly, the parties agree that zone scene is a coined term, which means we don't -- we have to look at the specification, and the specification is what's going to tell us what does zone scene mean with a coined term?

It's not just plain and ordinary meaning -- you look at the specification -- because they've made it up. They've made up a term. In this case, they've made up a term called "zone scene," and we have to look to the spec to see what it means.

Next slide.

Could we go to the next slide, please?

So here, Your Honor, I just want to underline the importance of this. This is the abstract for the '206 patent, which is the earliest patent they're asserting in this group. And here you see the discussion of -- in the abstract of what the invention is is essentially this thing, this theme or scene.

So it says: According to -- according to one aspect of the present invention, a mechanism is allowed -- is provided to allow a user to group some of the players according to a theme or scene, wherein each of the players is located in a zone.

So you have multiple zones that are grouped into a single

theme or scene, then it continues: When the scene is activated, the players in the scene react in a synchronized manner.

And it goes on to talk about how the scene works. So this word "scene" that's been coined and added to the claims here is the heart of what they're saying is new and unique in this patent. And in our view the proposed construction that -- well, let's continue.

Next slide.

The specification provides an example of what a zone scene is. And so here -- this is Slide 13, Column -- the '206 patent, Column 9, Lines 36 through 41: For example, a "Morning" scene includes three zones, each in a bedroom, a den and a dining room. After selecting the scene, the user may set up an alarm for the scene as a whole.

So here --

THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven, let me ask you this: If -- you know, number one, it's kind of cautioned, as every good writer would do, by saying "according to one embodiment," and I'm sure I'll hear from the plaintiff in a second.

But if this is the way the specification -- what the specification says about it, why do I need to add that to the claim construction?

MR. VERHOEVEN: Well, in your tentative, Your Honor, the -- in your tentative, you've adopted the plaintiff's

proposed construction, which I'm going to get to -- I can go right there right now, if you would like, Your Honor -- and in our view that does not require a scene or a theme. It's the same thing as a definition of a zone.

And so we think that, at a minimum, it should just be plain and ordinary meaning of what a scene or theme is. But we can't have a construction that reads out that there has to be a scene or a theme and the word "zone scene" because that's what the innovation is in this patent.

And if we construe it -- could we go to the slide -- just one second, Your Honor. Let's go to Slide 14.

So actually, Your Honor, in the lead up to this Markman, Sonos told us that they didn't want a construction and no construction was necessary for zone scene. This is just an excerpt of the chart that was provided.

But in their brief for the first time -Go to the next slide.

-- they provided a definition. And this is an excerpt from their brief -- I'm on Slide 15, Your Honor -- Sonos' reply brief at Page 12. This is the first time they provided a proposed construction in the reply brief.

And as you see in the proposed construction, there is no definition or construction of what a scene is. And so what they proposed is a previously-saved group of zone players.

Okay. Well, that's a zone. A previously-saved group of zone

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    players that are configured for synchronous playback of the
    media when the zone scene is invoked. But there's no
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    construction of what a zone scene actually is in this proposed
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    definition, Your Honor. It's just recursive.
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         And so --
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         THE COURT: Which slide are you on?
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: I'm on Slide 15, Your Honor.
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         THE COURT: Okay.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: And if you look at --
         THE COURT:
                     This --
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: This is just an excerpt.
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                          I got this. I'm going to ask the
         THE COURT: No.
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    plaintiff to put a pin in this one and I'll ask -- I mean, it's
    pretty obvious the point you're making, and I get it, but it
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    seems to me this is probably at the heart of what you're
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    arguing here.
         So whenever it is you're -- in fact, then let me go ahead
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    and hear from plaintiff's counsel why it is that saying "for
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    synchronous playback of media when the zone scene is invoked"
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    is sufficient articulation of what a zone scene is.
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         MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. Rory Shea on behalf of Sonos
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    to address this issue. And good to see you again, Your Honor.
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         THE COURT: Good to see you, my friend.
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         MR. SHEA: It's been a little while.
25
         Yes. So zone scene. What -- I think there's been a
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couple things here, Your Honor, that have been a little misleading.

First of all, let me address the point that's on the screen first, then I can circle back to a couple things. But the critical thing here about a zone scene is that it is a previously-saved group of players that will be configured for synchronous playback when invoked. That's the key here, Your Honor.

And if you look at the specification and you look at the background leading into this technology, this makes total sense. Sonos' original grouping technology -- for starters, it's a foundational aspect of Sonos' system to have the ability to group zone players together for synchronous playback.

That's one of the foundational things. It's been in -- it was originally disclosed in patents as early as 2004. It's been in Sonos' commercial product since 2005.

The original mechanism, the original way that groups were formed was in a more ad hoc manner. So what you had to do -- and, Your Honor, I don't know if you've ever used this Sonos system, but the way you generally group players is, you go -- at the time you decide you want to hear synchronous playback in multiple -- on multiple players, you go in on a one-by-one basis, you say, I want to hear it on this player and this player and this player and this player. And it's something I do at my house, for instance, often.

What the invention of this patent is, is it realized -the inventors recognized that having to go through that process
every time you want to hear synchronous playback in a given set
of players can start to get a little cumbersome if you're often
using the same group.

So to give an example, let's say that every evening I like to listen to my three players that are in my upstairs level.

But then during the daytime, I break those apart, maybe I listen to something else in a different place in my home. And then I want to go back and listen to those same three players in my upstairs level again the next night.

What this invention realized is, okay, in order to make that process more efficient, what we can do is we can allow a user to previously save a predefined grouping -- and that's the phrase right out of the specification, "predefined grouping" -- of players that can then later be invoked when the user wants to hear audio synchronously in that group.

And prior to that time, prior to invocation of that group, what the specification teaches is that those players would not be grouped together. They would be individual, in which case you could listen to one piece of media on one player and another piece of media on another player.

But when you were to a point where you wanted to listen to audio synchronously across those multiple players, you would then be able to invoke this previously-saved group, which could

be as simple as a single selection by a user. You pick the previously-saved group, you select it. And in one selection, as an example, it would then kick off the grouping process as opposed to having to go and select each individual player you want to put into that group.

That is what a zone scene is, and that's what the specification teaches. It's taught both in the non-provisional disclosure as well as the provisional disclosure, which you'll notice, defendant does not provide any analysis or address at all in their briefing.

But that is what a zone scene is, and that's what our construction here is saying, is that unlike a group that's created in an ad hoc manner, what a zone scene is is it's a previously saved so that when it's later invoked the players will be configured for synchronous playback. And that's what the construction says here.

Now, the use of the term "zone scene" in this was just by nature of the fact that what causes the invocation is a later selection of that zone scene. But you could -- in theory, you could use a different term there if there was any sort of concern with recursiveness.

You could, for instance, say that it's -- it's a previously-saved group that are configured for synchronous playback of media when that grouping is invoked, if there's some concern. Although, I do think that saying that it's a

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    grouping that will be configured for synchronous playback when
    the zone scene is invoked is probably the most precise and
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    accurate way to say it in view of the specification, Your
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    Honor, but that is why that term appears within the
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    construction.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         Your Honor, may I respond briefly?
 7
         THE COURT: No. No. I'm kidding.
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         (Laughter.)
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         THE COURT: But if you all would be kind enough --
                         You're on the screen now, Your Honor.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN:
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    Just giving you some warning.
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         THE COURT: -- to give me -- if you'll give me just a
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    minute or two, my computer's working, I'm told, and I'm going
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    to switch back to my computer, which is a little better.
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         But while I'm doing that, if you'll both be thinking --
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    I'm thinking of editing my preliminary construction. If you
    guys want to write it down to being this. And then,
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    Mr. Verhoeven, you can start. But this is -- I know
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    occasionally lawyers or clients must be wondering what I'm
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    doing here, am I listening to you guys. I'm usually doing what
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    I was doing here, which is communicating with my law clerk, and
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    I had addressed an issue I had with an -- on our preliminary
    construction.
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24
         This is the -- this is going to be the more likely
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    construction: A previously-saved group of zone players
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1
    according to a common theme.
         Let me say that again: A previously-saved group of zone
 2
    players according to a common theme.
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         If you all will give me just a minute or two, I'm going to
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 5
    try and get on my computer. I'll be right back with you guys.
 6
         (Pause in proceedings.)
 7
         THE COURT: Can you all see me now?
 8
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor.
 9
         THE COURT: Okay. Very good. And I have Slide 15 back
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    up.
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         Mr. Verhoeven, the floor is yours.
12
         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         Thank you, Your Honor.
13
         The proposed construction that you read before switching
    to your computer is acceptable to my client, Your Honor.
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    just -- but just to underline the point -- and I hate to speak
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    after you've given me what I'm asking for, but just because I
    know the other side's going to say something.
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18
         Can we go to Slide 17?
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         I just wanted to illustrate, Your Honor, because what
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    they've -- on the left here is their construction, what they're
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    proposing. On the right is the picture of the zone without a
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    zone scene that we looked at.
         Now, if you read their construction, it reads on zone
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    without even a zone scene. So zone is a previously-saved group
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of zone players. Okay. And so without a theme, just saying

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    it's previously saved is reading out the way -- the word scene
    or theme. And with that, I'll sit down.
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         THE COURT: Any -- woops.
         Anything else from plaintiff's counsel with regard to the
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    Court's proposed construction?
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         MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. A couple points.
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         First of all, again, I just want to -- I want to just
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    address this last point that Mr. Verhoeven made because I just
 9
    don't think it's accurate or correct.
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         There is a critical distinction there in the portion of
    the construction, our original proposed construction, that
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    defendant is not highlighting or giving credence to, which is
13
    this concept of "when invoked."
14
         The big difference between a zone scene and a zone is a
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    zone is effectively just a logical way to identify players in a
16
    multiplayer system. That's what a zone is.
17
         A zone scene is the concept that you have a predefined
    previously-saved group that can live in an uninvoked state as
18
    well as an invoked state.
19
20
         And so I think that that is a key distinction between that
21
    and a zone.
22
         Now, the other thing, Your Honor, I want to address. And
23
    if you don't mind, I'm going to pull up my slide deck.
```

agree with what I just proposed or not, because it seems I've

THE COURT: What I'm not following is whether or not you

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taken into consideration what you just said, which is it has to be a previously-saved group of zone players.

MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. And I agree, and the previously-saved group part, certainly we are in agreement with.

The common theme raises a couple concerns that I wanted to address from our perspective, Your Honor. One thing that we have a concern about is that we believe that common theme can introduce and may introduce ambiguity into this construction in terms of what that phrase and that term means. And so just a little history about the term "theme" in the context of these patents.

First of all, the phrase "common theme" is actually not a phrase that you see anywhere in the intrinsic evidence at all. The only term that is in there is "theme." And one of the things to be aware of is, theme is actually a word that was never used one time in the provisional application that serves as the priority application here at all. So theme was a word that was added afterwards in the non-provisional application.

If we look at what the provisional says about what a zone scene is, it does not use the word "theme" at all. And what it talks about is that it's -- again, it's a previously-saved group that allows you to pre-create this group so that it can be invoked later.

And just a couple of samplings of things, Your Honor. I'm

looking at Slide 50 of our PowerPoint here, which is one of the excerpts from the provisional application.

You can see here that it talks about the zone scene feature allowing the user to arrange zones into groups using a single command, and it contrasts that with linking zones one at a time, which is that concept I touched on earlier.

Moving to the next slide. This is Slide 51 of our presentation.

That -- this is another excerpt from that same page of the provisional, and you'll see that it says that "the simple scene allows a user to set up a single zone group per scene."

It talks about a "morning scene," which would group three different sets of zone players together but would leave all other zones in the household untouched.

THE COURT: Well, let me interrupt you here and ask you this: I mean, here's the problem, because it -Mr. Verhoeven's right, this is a coined phrase, which is certainly acceptable. But if we don't have something to tether how the previously-saved group was put together, then how does anyone know what a zone -- what -- I get that it is a previously-saved group of zone players. I get that last night I went and listened to, you know, a grouping that I wanted to have saved.

But for the claim term to mean anything, a "zone scene" to mean anything, that's without -- what would you propose instead

of what we have here, which is "to a common theme"?

What you had in your proposal that we went with on the preliminary was just kicking the can down the road a little bit by saying "when the zone scene is invoked."

What -- how is the previously-saved group of zone players done to form a zone scene?

MR. SHEA: Well, Your Honor, what I think we -- with the zone scene, the -- what it really is is it's -- it is a previously-saved group, but it's -- that previously-saved group is defined in that it is -- it enables players to be become configured for synchronous playback when it is later invoked.

So the characteristic of it is that it's -- not only is it previously saved, but it's previously saved in a way that allows it to exist in an uninvoked state and then to be later activated or invoked in order to then put these players into a configuration in which they would play back in synchrony.

And exactly, you know, what -- how it is that the players are grouped together, I think the specification would teach that. In fact, the provisional walks through various different mechanisms you can use to actually put the players into that saved group.

But the key is that once you've created that saved group, it's a thing that exists in this dormant state until it gets invoked, at which time it then triggers the players to become configured for synchronous playback. And so that really is

1 | what the zone scene is described.

So in our view, you know, when we talk about a common theme, really it's -- the theme here -- I think, in some ways, we're looking at it in a more specific way. The theme here is that the players are to be grouped for synchronous playback when they are ultimately invoked.

THE COURT: Is there anything else you wanted to add before I turn to Mr. Verhoeven?

MR. SHEA: I think I can pause at that point, Your Honor. You know, depending on what Mr. Verhoeven says, I may reserve the right to respond, if you'll allow me.

THE COURT: You guys, no one enjoys listening to good lawyers more than I do. This has been a delightful morning.

So just -- I'll hear from Mr. Verhoeven, then, Mr. Shea, you can say anything you care to.

MR. VERHOEVEN: I'll merely add, Your Honor, that if you look at this provisional, it says, for example, morning scene. That's exactly what's in the specification that I showed you, what I was reading: For example, a "Morning" scene includes three zone players, each in a bedroom, den and dining room.

This is showing the exact same thing, and it's giving it a theme. It's called "morning scene." So --

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Verhoeven, let me ask you this -- and, you know, back when we met 15 years ago, I don't know whether I would've had the courage to ask someone of your

1 caliber or Mr. Shea this question, but I get to now, I guess
2 because I have this job.

But it seems to me what you're tying to do -- and I understand why -- is limit the construction of the claim to include that which is in the specification here.

That being said, if the -- again, if the plaintiff takes a position that Google infringes and that they have a zone scene and they don't -- and Google doesn't do what's supported in the specification, then why wouldn't you have a good noninfringement claim that is divorced from what the Markman construction is of zone scene?

MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, the issue is, the way that the other side is proposing to construe this, it takes out the notion of a scene or theme out of the construction and merely requires it to be a predefined grouping.

I'm not sure I understand all this business about invoking it in the future and saving. It's -- what we're talking about is what the patent says. It says "zone scene," and the specification -- the abstract says the -- which we covered, says: The invention is grouping it according to a scene or a theme.

So we've proposed a common theme because that's what the specification says is an alternative way of describing scene.

And the theme would be, for example, grouping three areas as a morning scene or a morning theme because you get up in the

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morning and these are the three areas you want to have music
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 2
    in.
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         You could do the same thing -- and the patent provides
    examples -- for other types of zone scenes for different times
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 5
    of day or different types of events, Your Honor.
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         That's what they have alleged, the patentee has alleged,
 7
    is the innovation over just grouping zones.
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         THE COURT: Can you -- could one of you, either of you,
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    pull up the claim itself so I can see the use of the words
10
    "zone scene" in the context of the claim?
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         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         Sure.
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         MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor. Let me -- so, Your Honor,
    here is a -- an example. This is one of -- oh, sorry about
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    that. This is one of the three patents that the term appears.
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15
         THE COURT: Okay. Just give me a second to review this.
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         Mr. Verhoeven, I interrupted you, I'm sorry, to ask that.
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    You can say whatever else you want, and then I'll switch back
18
    to Mr. Shea.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: Sure. So the point I'm making, Your
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    Honor --
         Switch back to our slides real briefly. It's Slide 16.
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         On the left here, Your Honor, this is Slide 16. It's just
23
    an illustration. This is what the patent says is new and
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    unique, that you can group zones, two or three zones together,
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    according to a theme.
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Now, if you take out the theme, the morning, and all you say is it's a predefined grouping, then you've just got the thing on the right, which is simply a zone. And the zone is not new or unique.

And, you know, we can go into the reasons why we're making certain arguments, if you want. I mean, Google doesn't do themes like this, but that's not really appropriate for claim construction. We're just looking at the intrinsic evidence.

In the intrinsic evidence it's very clear that this is the big thing they're saying is new or unique, that they've created this idea of having a scene or theme. And they give examples of a morning one, and they talk about grouping more than one zones (sic) together according to the theme. And that's exactly what Your Honor, in your latest proposed construction, has encompassed.

So we think you should go with what you proposed in your latest proposal, Your Honor. Otherwise, if you're just talking about a predefined grouping that can be invoked, you're just talking about zones. You're not talking about putting zones together in a theme.

THE COURT: Mr. Shea?

MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.

So again, I have to address this because it's just -- it's absolutely just incorrect and, I think, intentionally misleading about the difference between these things.

A zone is a fixed, static thing, and that's what it's described as. So to the extent that there could be -- in most cases, a zone is a single player. There are some examples where a zone -- what Mr. Verhoeven is referring to as a zone could refer to multiple players. But in that case, that is a fixed concept, and it's a way to logically identify players in the system.

This concept of previously saving to then later be invoked, zone has nothing do with that, Your Honor. A zone is always invoked. It is fixed. It is constant. Once you form a zone, that zone is not -- is active perpetually.

The zone scene, the critical thing here is that that's not what a zone scene is and, from a user functionality standpoint, is a critical distinction. Because with a zone, once you put a player into a zone, it's fixed. You can't play individually on that player. It is now part of this static, fixed concept of a zone.

A zone scene, you add a player to a zone scene unless and until you invoke that zone scene in order to bring those players together for synchronous playback, you continue to have the ability to individually play on that player.

So if I could give you an example, let's say I have a player in my kitchen and a player in my bathroom. I can put those two players in a zone scene -- and this is shown in our tutorial as well, Your Honor. But I can put those two players

into a zone scene, kitchen and bathroom, and then name it something.

And whether I name it "morning" or -- "downstairs" is a very common name I use in my zone scenes, but whatever name I give it so that I remember what it is later, I've created that zone scene. But I can continue to play individually just in my kitchen, continue to play individually just in my bathroom.

And only when I desire to put those things together, link them and play synchronously across both of them, do I then actually take the step of invoking and using this scene.

And so that is a critical distinction. That is what a zone scene is, Your Honor.

A couple other things I want to address. I mean, there's a lot of focus being placed on this notion of the zone scene having a morning name or an afternoon name or whatever it is. To be clear, these are just user-entered names for a zone scene. And the spec tells us that, right?

It says here, right here that, for instance, the Figure 3A, it says -- shows the effects of grouping the zones to make a group of three zones named after "morning."

So yeah. You can give it a name like morning, but you can name a zone scene whatever you'd like. You know, really at the end of the day, whether it's morning or whatnot, it's a way for the user to create some sort of association, predefined grouping of those players, and give it a name that you can then

use later to invoke it.

So if -- I struggle a little bit with the word "common theme" for a couple of reasons, Your Honor.

One, this term "common" in front of "theme," that's something that -- the term "common" doesn't appear in the specification even where it does use "theme." So we have some concerns about that creating some additional ambiguity.

Secondly, the word "theme" in the specification is used directly as a synonym for a zone scene. I mean, what the specification tells us is that a -- they repeatedly use those as alternatives in a way that says that -- that's all a theme is. It's just a different shorthand word for a zone scene.

So defining zone scene to include the phrase "common theme" I think presents a concern of -- it's just -- it's as circular, if not more, than what we have proposed. And it then interjects this confusion, and I think Mr. Verhoeven kind of highlighted it for you, Your Honor.

I mean, what defendants plan to do is to ask for this common theme construction and then turn around and use that and read in limitations into that phrase to try to distinguish technology that otherwise is exactly what these zone scenes are that are described in the specification.

THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven?

MR. SHEA: So -- sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Were you done, Mr. Shea?

MR. SHEA: Yeah. I didn't know if you were going to have any comments.

I mean, the last thing, you know, maybe, Your Honor, just before I pass things back, what I wanted to do is just -- sorry. Let me go to here.

To just underpin my point about the theme, these are both examples right from the specification where you can see it says "using what is referred to as a theme or a zone scene." Excuse me. And then here again, you say, "Providing a player theme or a zone scene."

So these -- my apologies. Hold on one second, Your Honor.

I was informed that I wasn't showing that.

But these two paths, just from the specification, which are shown on Slide 56 of our presentation, show that really a theme is just -- it's just a different term for a zone scene.

It's not a requirement or a limitation of what a zone scene is.

What that is is this previously-saved group of players for later invocation in order to enable them to play back in synchrony.

So I guess, Your Honor, maybe my final point was, if by common theme, if what that term means is that there's some name assigned to this previously-saved predefined grouping of players that allows them to be called up and invoked later, if that's what common theme means, I think that's certainly something that we would be amenable to.

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But if common theme is intended to mean something more or
something that -- I don't quite know what it means if it's not
a name, then we do believe that that presents more ambiguity
than anything else.
     THE COURT: Well, right now what I have is:
previously-saved group of zone players according to a common
theme.
     That's what the construction is and sounds to me like
you're okay with that.
     MR. SHEA: Yeah. With the caveat that as long as the
common theme in that context refers to having some name that's
assigned to that grouping of players, then we are amenable to
that construction.
     THE COURT: Well, you're going to have a construction,
Mr. Verhoeven's going to have a construction, and you can have
your people determine, based on that construction, whether or
not you think there's infringement or not, and he can say there
is or isn't.
     So is there anything else you wanted to add?
     MR. SHEA: No, Your Honor.
     THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven?
     MR. VERHOEVEN: Nothing more, Your Honor.
     THE COURT: I'll be back in a few seconds.
     (Pause in proceedings.)
     THE COURT: Okay. We're going back on the record.
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         The construction for that claim term is going to be:
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    previously-saved group of zone players according to a common
 3
    theme.
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         Since I have jumped around here a bit, Mr. Verhoeven, you
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    happen to be on screen, so I'll start with you. Other than the
 6
    indefinite -- the claim terms where there are issues and
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    arguments over whether or not they're indefinite, are there any
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    other claim terms that we need to take up, just so I don't
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    accidentally miss any of them?
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: No. I'm arquing, Your Honor, the "zone"
    terms. And the answer to the zone -- on the "zone" term claims
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12
            There aren't any others.
    is no.
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         There's two indefiniteness claims that are related to
    zones, one of which, I assume, the other side would like to
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    argue, but I'm not sure.
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         THE COURT: Right.
         MR. VERHOEVEN: One of which we would like to argue.
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         THE COURT: Okay. So which one did you want to argue?
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    can take that one up first, and then --
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         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         Sure.
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         THE COURT: Then we'll take up "causing the selectable
    indication" second.
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         So which one did you want?
2.4
         MR. VERHOEVEN: So there's -- this gets a little
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    confusing, Your Honor. There's competing -- unfortunately, we
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    were unable to agree on how to separate out the terms for
    construction. So you see -- if you could look at our -- I
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    think it's simplest to just look at our proposed groupings, and
    so we have a "group configuration" term --
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         THE COURT: Yes, sir.
         MR. VERHOEVEN: -- and a "zone configuration" term, Your
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 7
    Honor.
 8
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
         MR. VERHOEVEN: And we said both of those are indefinite.
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    If it -- if I may, I'd like to address those both together
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    because they're indefinite vis-à-vis each other.
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         THE COURT: Okay. Sure.
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         MR. VERHOEVEN: Okay. So if we could go to Slide 22.
         So the issue here is, we've got two terms, "zone
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15
    configuration" and "group configuration." And we've argued
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    they're indefinite because in -- a person of ordinary skill,
    Your Honor, would not be able to determine when one begins and
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18
    when another begins and ends.
19
         And so the issue is, does the intrinsic evidence provide
20
    enough guidance to a person of ordinary skill to know if
21
    they've met or not met the group configuration and zone
22
    configuration elements.
23
         If you go to the next slide, please.
24
         So basically, pictorially, Your Honor, this is our
25
    argument, which is on Slide 23, which is, this -- we don't know
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where one begins, one ends, whether one's included in the other or not, to what extent.

And so that's the indefiniteness. I mean, phrase "group configuration" itself is not indefinite by itself, neither is zone configuration, if they were just next to each other -- or excuse me, if they were just stated in isolation.

But if you look at the way the claims talk about them, it's very -- it's just impossible to tell the difference.

If you go to Slide 25.

Here it is in the claim for Your Honor. I know you'd like to look at the claim. So here -- this is Claim 1 of the '206 patent. I've highlighted the portion where it talks about these things.

And it says: The zone configuration characterizes one or more zone scenes, each zone scene identifying a group configuration.

So it says both zone configuration and group configuration in the same sentence. And it's what I refer to as a syntactical ambiguity. It's -- we don't know, is group configuration meant to be a synonym for zone configuration? Is it something different? If it's different, what is it?

That's the problem we have with these two terms, Your Honor.

Now, there's no dispute that both sides agree that these terms can't be construed to mean the same thing because they

have different words. One's zone configuration and one's group configuration. So that's undisputed, Your Honor. They must have different meanings.

But when you look at the specification, the claim doesn't provide any clarity. When you look at the specification, it makes things worse, Your Honor.

So if we can go to the next slide.

If you look in the specification -- this is Slide 26, and I'm highlighting the common spec from the '206 patent, Column 5, 43 through 50 and 54 through 59. And as you'll see here, Your Honor, this is what the spec says: Zone group configuration characterizing a zone group.

And then it repeats it: Typically, a saved zone group configuration file is transmitted.

And so again, the specification doesn't provide any clarity on when you have a zone configuration versus a group configuration, even though both parties agree that these two phrases must have separate meanings.

Next slide.

2.4

We provided an expert witness who's stated he's gone through this and can't tell the distinction. I know -- I'm not going to rely on my own expert. I'll rely on the other side's expert, Your Honor.

So if we can go to the next slide.

One of the reasons that's glaringly obvious as to why this

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1
    is a problem is even their own expert can't distinguish zone
    configuration from group configuration. So he was asked at his
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    deposition -- this is Mr. Almeroth: Can you provide an example
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    of a zone configuration?
         And this is his transcript at Page 53, Lines 15 through
 5
 6
    54, Line 2. And his answer eventually is: I don't have an
 7
    example.
 8
         And then the next slide, please.
 9
         We asked him the same thing about group configuration.
    This is from the transcript at Page 58, Line 22 through 59,
10
11
    Line 18:
         "Can you give me example of a group configuration?
12
13
         "Answer: That's not something I tried to do.
14
         "Question: You can't provide me a single example of a
15
    group configuration?
16
         "Answer: I would need to give it some thought."
         So even the other side's expert, when we've -- we've teed
17
18
    this up as an indefiniteness problem, was unable at his
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    deposition, knowing that in advance, to provide any examples of
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    how to distinguish one from the other. I think that's telling.
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         In addition, the evidence that the expert relies -- their
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    expert relies on to provide a distinction is the same evidence
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    we just looked at.
2.4
         Can we go to the next slide?
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         So here's his declaration, and I just highlighted in green
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where the cites are. And we put those cites up on the next slide, please.

This is Slide 31. These are the same excerpts we've been looking at. So this is Column 5, Line 43 through 57, and Column 7, Line 31 through 33. And again, as I showed you before, it just says "zone group configuration" here, Your Honor. So their expert points to the same thing I just pointed to, which provides no guidance whatsoever.

Next slide.

2.4

In its opposition brief, Sonos provides an attempted distinction between two, Your Honor. They say that a zone configuration is different because it "comprises a data representation of a zone scene."

And then they continue and they say: Group configuration provides a previously-saved grouping.

So apparently, from reading this, Your Honor, the best I can tell is the distinction they're drawing is they say that a zone grouping is the saved grouping -- or excuse me -- a zone configuration is a saved grouping and a zone configuration is simply a data representation of that same saved grouping, which doesn't make any sense and is inconsistent with the actual claims of the patent.

Go to the next slide.

Next slide.

This is Slide 34, Your Honor, and I put up Dependent

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Claim 7. And it's talking about this "further configured to."
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    And this is Dependent Claim 7, dependent on Claim 1.
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 3
         And it says: Further configured to: Before receiving the
    zone configuration, send, to one of plurality of independent
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 5
    playback devices, a command to save at least one of the one or
 6
    more zone scenes.
 7
         Well, then zone scene is already saved before the zone
 8
    configuration is received. So it can't be true that a zone
 9
    configuration is simply a later-created data representation of
10
    a zone scene. It's inconsistent with the dependent claims of
11
    the patent.
12
         So long story -- in sum, Your Honor, this is -- the reason
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    we've argued for this is because we want -- we should be able
    to -- be able to determine what is a zone configuration, what
14
15
    is a group configuration, and are we doing one or not?
16
         And here, if you look at the intrinsic evidence, there's
17
    no guidance for us. And as a result, we can't distinguish
18
    between the two.
19
         That's all I have to say on that one, Your Honor.
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         THE COURT:
                     Thank you, sir. Can -- I'm not sure who will
21
    be representing Sonos on this.
22
         MR. SHEA: Your Honor, it's going to be Rory Shea again on
23
    behalf of Sonos.
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THE COURT: Mr. Shea?

MR. SHEA: Okay. Great.

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I'm going to share some slides, Your Honor, here. One moment.

So, Your Honor, I think -- with respect to these phrases,
I think we want to start right with the claim language and look
at what that claim language actually says. And the discussion
we just had a bit ago about zone scenes and what a zone scene
is and Your Honor's construction of that term now, I think,
sheds a lot of light on this.

What the claim element at issue says and the terminology that defendant is objecting to says is that you have a zone configuration that characterizes one or more zone scenes where each zone scene is identifying a group configuration associated with zone player -- with two or more of a plurality of independent playback devices.

So when we take this phrase and we look at this language step by step, just on the face of the language alone, Your Honor, it's clear what the differences are here.

So starting with group configuration, what that is, it's a configuration of a group. It's a grouping of zone players for synchronous playback and, effectively, it's some makeup or arrangement of zone players that are linked together into a (inaudible). That's what the phrase "group configuration" means in the context of this claim.

And what the claim says is that you have a zone scene that identifies such a group configuration, which makes sense. It's

in fact, exactly what we just talked about and what Your Honor has rendered as his construction for zone scene. A zone scene is a previously-saved grouping, or in other words, a previously-saved group configuration of zone players that, according to Your Honor's construction, would be according to a common theme.

So that's what a zone scene is. A zone scene identifies this group configuration, this arrangement or makeup of players.

So that phrase, looking at that phrase in context of the claim, is clear. You have a zone scene, it identifies a group configuration.

The preceding clause then says that you have a zone configuration that characterizes one or more zone scenes. And when you look at what zone configuration is, both there and elsewhere in the context of this claim, it's clear that what zone configuration here is, is it's some configuration data, some form of data that characterizes or provides information about one or more zone scenes, where each of those zone scenes identifies a group configuration.

And so that was -- that is what our construction of zone configuration was, Your Honor. But again, there is a clear distinction here between the two. Group configuration is -- it's just a configuration of a group. It's a makeup or arrangement of players that are within a group. In this case,

it's going to be a previously-saved group that's according to a common theme because of the zone scene language.

But that's what the group configuration is. It's that component of the zone scene that tells you which zone players are in that -- have been selected for inclusion in that zone scene.

And then zone configuration is something that characterizes one or more zone scenes. It's some sort of data that provides information or characterizes about those zone scenes.

And if we look at the other aspects of the claim with respect to the zone configuration, it just confirms that's what the term "zone configuration" means. It's this configuration data.

Specifically, it talks about the fact that it is something that's configured via a controller. It's maintained at the playback device. So after the group is saved, the zone scene is saved, it would be maintained at the playback device. It's received by the multimedia controller via a network interface and then is subsequently used to display the selectable indication.

So when you look at zone configuration in the context of that claim, that's what it's talking about. It's talking about some data set that gets passed back and forth between the controller and one or more of the players that serves to

characterize or provide some information about the zone scenes that have been saved in the -- in this system.

And not only do the claims tell you that's what zone configuration is, but that's -- the specification is consistent there as well, Your Honor. It says here that -- first of all, it's in the '206 patent at 5:51 through 57. This is on our Slide 36 -- that: According to one embodiment of the invention, the memory is used to save one or more saved zone configuration files that may be retrieved for modification.

So that's telling us that zone configuration in this context refers to configuration data.

Later on in the specification at 10:10 through 17, it also tells us that when a scene is saved, a set of data pertaining to that scene is stored. And those -- that's what this zone configuration is talking about. It's talking about this data that characterizes the zone scenes that have been saved in the -- in the system.

Now, you know, Your Honor, one other thing I wanted to address, defendants have actually raised a new argument for the first time now regarding this dependent claim as supposedly providing some sort of ambiguity or supporting their position on this. I want to address that as well. I'm going to pull it up in the context of the specification here.

I actually don't fully understand the argument, Your Honor, but what this claim says is that before the controller

receives zone configuration, so before the controller receives that data, it sends a command to save a scene. And so -- but how that supports any sort of concern about the meaning or difference between these terms doesn't make any sense to me.

What we're talking about here is, the zone configuration data is something that comes into existence when the zone scene is saved and would be initially maintained at the player. It's maintained at the player, and it's configured via the controller and maintained at the player and then subsequently received at the controller.

So there's no issue there -- or there's no temporal problem in what these -- this claim is saying. It all fits together perfectly.

You have a zone scene that identifies that group configuration. Once you save that zone scene, which could take place in the context of this claim via a command from the controller to save it, that's going to create some data -- configuration data -- "zone configuration" is the term used in the claim -- that's going to be maintained at the player. And then when the controller subsequently wants to present that information to a user so that they can select one of those zone scenes to listen to player -- audio on the players, the controller would then retrieve and receive that data, that configuration data, and use it to render this selectable indication on the screen.

So there's no ambiguity here in terms of what this -- the Claim 7, Dependent Claim 7 says.

Now, maybe, Your Honor, the last thing I just want to address is, with respect to the expert testimony, I mean, what -- our expert was not asked if he could distinguish between zone configuration and group configuration or provide examples of how to distinguish between them.

He was asked, in isolation, on the fly, whether he could provide examples of what a zone configuration is or what a group configuration is.

The fact that he was unwilling to do that on the fly during the deposition is not the test for indefiniteness, of course. The test is whether the language would be reasonably understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the intrinsic evidence and the claim language.

And again, we believe that, really, based on the claim language alone, that is the case and in view of how this claim language is phrased and what a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the term zone scene to mean in the context of this specification along with the other two terms.

THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven?

MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor. Really briefly. I'll just use this slide that they have up here, Slide 34.

Counsel spoke for a long time, but I couldn't distinguish what a group configuration or a zone configuration was based on

```
1
    what he said. I mean, he said a group -- a zone scene
    identifies a group configuration. I wrote that down, that's
 2
 3
    what he said.
         And then he said a zone configuration is any data --
 4
 5
    that's any information, and they have it right here -- that
    provides an indication of one or more zone scenes.
 6
 7
         Well, isn't that -- that's what they just said a group
    configuration was. So if they mean -- what do they mean by
 8
 9
    "provides an indication of," Your Honor?
         I mean, the group configuration is the configuration of
10
    the players within a zone scene, is what they say. So what's a
11
    zone configuration? Is it the same thing? Is it different?
12
         All they can come up with, Your Honor, is configuration
13
14
    data that provides an indication of one or more zone scenes.
15
         And first of all, none of this is -- this is all attorney
16
    argument. None of it's in the specification.
         And secondly, even with this attorney argument, the
17
18
    distinctions break down when you start looking at them.
19
         That's all I have to say, Your Honor.
         THE COURT: Mr. Shea, anything else?
20
         MR. SHEA: Your Honor, unless you have any specific
21
22
    questions -- I mean, I could address further -- I think it's
23
    laid out in our brief. So to keep it brief for you, I would
24
    say, unless you have other questions, I don't have anything to
```

add.

```
THE COURT: I'll be back.
 1
 2
         (Pause in proceedings.)
 3
         THE COURT: If we can go back on the record.
 4
         If you'll give me one second.
 5
         For the claim terms "zone configuration" and "group
 6
    configuration," the Court is going to amend its construction
 7
    and find that both these claim terms are indefinite.
 8
         What is the next claim term that we need to take up?
 9
         MR. SHEA: Your Honor, do I have any ability to respond to
10
    that?
11
         THE COURT: Not much. I mean, I've found that the -- I've
12
    made my decision. I'm ready to move on.
13
         What is the next claim term?
14
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, the next term in the zone --
15
    if we want to stick with "zone," which I think is most
    efficient, with the "zone" terms, the next term is one you've
16
17
    ruled in your tentative is indefinite. It's the "causing the
    selectable indication."
18
19
         THE COURT:
                     Right.
20
         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         It's a dependent claim. We are -- we're
21
    perfectly happy with the tentative, Your Honor, but I suspect
22
    the other side may want to argue, but I'm not sure.
23
         THE COURT: No. I'm sure they do.
2.4
         Mr. Shea, is that you taking up causing --
25
         MR. RICHTER: No. I think -- I apologize, Your Honor.
                                                                  Ι
```

```
1
    think that'll be me. Cole Richter for plaintiff Sonos.
         THE COURT: Mr. Richter.
 2
 3
         MR. RICHTER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. And if I can
    share my screen, I can bring my slides up here.
 4
 5
         Okay. I'd like to go starting with Slide -- or starting
    with Slide 12 and then on to 13 and 14.
 6
 7
         "Causing the selectable indication" is a phrase that
 8
    appears in Claim 19 of the '206 patent. And, Your Honor, both
 9
    sides agree that this -- well, actually, no.
10
         Sonos --
         THE COURT: Mr. Richter, I'm having a hard time hearing
11
12
    you. You might want to lean a little closer to the microphone,
13
    perhaps.
14
         MR. RICHTER: Yes. How's this, Your Honor? I'm using an
15
    earpiece, so it may be --
16
         THE COURT: That's good.
17
         MR. RICHTER:
                       Thank you.
18
         This claim and one other claim that I can get to later,
19
    these claims, Sonos contends, have typographical errors. And
20
    the preliminary indication from this Court is that these claims
    should be indefinite, but, you know, Sonos requests that the
21
22
    Court correct these typographical errors. And with such a
23
    correction, the indefiniteness problem falls away.
24
         So as you can see here on the screen, Claim 19 presently
25
    depends from Claim 17. This should -- Claim 19 should actually
```

```
1
    depend from Claim 18. And when it does, the antecedent problem
    falls away, and there's no more indefiniteness. And I can show
 2
    you why this should be the case with two more slides.
 3
         So first, on Slide 14, we know that Claim 19 should depend
 4
 5
    from Claim 18 because we can look at a mirror image set of
 6
    claims with Independent Claim 12, Dependent Claim 13 and
 7
    Dependent Claim 14.
 8
         In this set of claims, actually, Claim 13 depends from
 9
    Claim 12, and then Claim 14 depends from Claim 13. These are
    mirror image claims to Claim 17, 18 and 19 in all respects
10
11
    except for this error. Claim 12 is a method, and Claim 17 is a
12
    CRM.
13
         And so, like Claim 14, which depends from Dependent
14
    Claim 13, that's what Claim 19 should do. It should depend
15
    from Claim 18 instead. And you can see here -- here's the
16
    language -- "at least one of the one or more zone scenes"
17
    provides the antecedent for the "at least one of the one or
18
    more zone scenes."
19
         So Sonos just respectfully requests that the Court correct
20
    the error, and the indefiniteness problem would fall away.
21
         So if Your Honor has any questions, I'm happy to entertain
22
    those. Otherwise, I would pass the mic.
23
         THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven?
24
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Really briefly. Can we put up our slides,
```

please, and go to Slide 35?

2

3

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So this is the one about antecedent basis, Your Honor, and we're talking about a dependent claim. And the issue is whether or not the lack of the antecedent basis renders it indefinite. Your Honor's tentative finds that it does. Let's go to the next slide. If you look at the claims themselves, Claim 19 says: computer readable medium of Claim 17, wherein causing the selectable indication of the at least one of the one or more zone scenes to be displayed comprises... And then it goes on. If you look at the antecedent, Claim 17, there is no antecedent basis for this highlighted phrase. Instead, the antecedent is selectable indication of the received zone configuration, not the at least one or more zone scenes. So we pointed this out and said that this renders it indefinite. In response --Next slide. -- we were told that this is an obvious error, "an obvious scrivener's error." Next slide. As Your Honor knows, undoubtedly, the standard here, if someone says there's an error and asks the Court to correct it, is this test of Novo Industries, 350 F.3d 1348, and I'm citing to 1357, where it says: A district court can correct a patent only if the correction is not subject to reasonable debate

based on a consideration of the claim language and the

```
1
    specification.
         Next slide.
 2
 3
         There's no debate here, Your Honor. Claim 19 says:
    computer readable medium of Claim 17. There's no ambiguity.
 4
    There's no debate that this is referring the person of ordinary
 5
 6
    skill to Claim 17, not Claim 18.
 7
         And as Your Honor knows, patentees freely write dependent
 8
    claims on -- that depend from various other earlier claims.
 9
    And there's absolutely no reason why a person of ordinary skill
10
    in the art would look at this and say, aha, I can tell they
11
    must have meant Claim 18, not Claim 17.
         It's unambiguous. It directs the reader to Claim 17, and
12
13
    now we have an admission, through the briefing process, that
14
    there is no antecedent basis.
15
         Next slide.
         The argument you heard was that you should substitute the
16
    reference to Claim 17, delete that and replace it with Claim
17
18
    18, but -- and we think that's inappropriate because of the
19
    argument we just made.
20
         THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven, can you hold on for just one
21
    second?
22
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor.
23
         (Pause in the proceedings.)
2.4
         THE COURT: If we can go back on the record.
25
         Let me go back to counsel for the plaintiff. I am -- my
```

```
1
    concern is on Slide 40, which is up, if the -- if I could hear
    from plaintiff as to why the difference between in 18 -- Claim
 2
 3
    18, it saying "of the received zone configuration" and, in 19,
    it says "of the at least one of the one or more zone scenes,"
 4
    why that doesn't make your argument harder, that it's obvious
 5
    that it should have been 18 instead of -- it should have been
 6
 7
    Claim 18 from which Claim 19 depended rather than Claim 17,
 8
    which is contained in Claim 19.
 9
         MR. RICHTER: Sure.
10
         THE COURT: I said all that to try and make clear on the
11
    record what I was asking, but I think you got my point.
12
         MR. RICHTER: Yes, indeed, Your Honor.
         So the antecedent for "the at least one of the one or more
13
    zone scenes" actually comes from the phrase that is not
14
15
    highlighted by the defendant on the screen.
16
         So we see: Comprises causing an indication of the at
17
    least one of the one or more zone scenes to be displayed. And
18
    so that's the antecedent. And when I showed it on my slide,
19
    actually I had bolded the text. And that came from plaintiff's
20
    Slide 13 and 14. But that provides antecedent of at least one
21
    of the one or more zone scenes to be displayed.
22
         And if -- I'm hoping that answers your question, Your
23
    Honor, but I'm happy to clarify it more.
2.4
         THE COURT:
                     It did.
25
         Mr. Verhoeven, if you want to -- if you'd like to respond
```

```
1
    to that. And then I'll come back to you, Mr. Richter, in just
 2
    a second.
 3
         MR. RICHTER: Okay. No problem.
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor.
 4
         So first of all, the biggest hurdle would be, how on Earth
 5
 6
    would we know that when they say Claim 17 they meant Claim 18
 7
    when it expressly says Claim 17?
 8
         And that's --
 9
         THE COURT: I'm over -- I mean, you and I might disagree
10
    on that. I can handle that one.
11
         MR. VERHOEVEN: Okay. And then on this one --
12
         THE COURT: You and I might disagree about how in the
13
    world someone would know that, and this is actually one where I
    don't think I would be completely wrong if I said that, if you
14
15
    were on the other side having to make this argument, you could
16
    probably do so with a straight face.
         Certainly the argument that it should have been 18 and not
17
    17 is a colorable one. And so I understand why you're saying
18
19
    it isn't, I understand why they are. But I'm concerned now
20
    about whether or not 18 actually provides --
21
         MR. VERHOEVEN:
                         I'm sorry, Your Honor.
22
               To answer your direct question directly, no.
23
    Because I'm a person of ordinary skill in the art and I'm
24
    looking, saying, I didn't find the antecedent in 17, maybe they
25
    meant 18, which I doubt they would do, but if they did that,
```

```
1
    when you're looking at 18, the phrase is -- in 19 is "causing
    the selectable indication of the at least one or more zone
 2
 3
    scenes."
         Here in 18, it says: Wherein causing the selectable
 4
 5
    indication of the received zone configuration to be displayed.
 6
         So what they're talking about, the selectable indication
    that's to be displayed, are different things, Your Honor. And
 7
 8
    so that further clouds any argument that a person of ordinary
 9
    skill in the art would know to go to 18, and that's why we put
10
    this up here.
11
         I have nothing further, Your Honor, unless you have
12
    questions.
13
         THE COURT: I don't. If y'all will give me just one
14
    second.
15
         (Pause in proceedings.)
16
         THE COURT: So here's what I'm going to do, and I'm trying
    to do my best to protect everyone's record here on appeal. My
17
18
    sense is, given my prior ruling with regard to indefiniteness,
19
    this claim term would have issues anyway.
20
         That being said, I don't know that I'm correct or not
21
    correct once this appellate court were to review my earlier
22
    claim construction.
23
         And so I'm going to go ahead and rule on this anyway. And
24
    I'm going to -- were -- had I not ruled earlier with regard to
```

the invalidity of some of the claim terms that are involved

25

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here, I would find that this was a mistake and that it should
 1
    have been 18 rather than 17 and that there would be antecedent
 2
 3
    basis and it would not be indefinite. But I think -- my sense
    is that that's probably a pyrrhic victory for the moment at
 4
 5
    least.
 6
         So let's move then to the final -- I think there's just
 7
    one indefinite claim term to take up left, correct?
 8
         MR. RICHTER: Yes. I think that's right, Your Honor. And
 9
    I think that's "a media particular playback system," which is
10
    in the '615 patent.
11
         THE COURT: I'm having a hard time -- I don't know why,
    maybe it's just me and I'm old, but I'm -- if you'll make sure
12
13
    your sound's turned up. I want to make sure I can hear you.
14
         MR. RICHTER: No problem. I apologize for that.
15
         THE COURT: No apology needed.
16
         MR. RICHTER: And so let me share my screen again, if
17
    you'll permit me.
18
         And this is a dependent claim in the '615 patent, Your
19
    Honor, actually three dependent claims. And they -- this one
20
    also contains a stray word, and I'll show you how that
21
    occurred.
22
         But here's the phrase in red in Claim 3. It says: A
23
    media particular playback system that includes a first zone and
24
    a second zone.
25
         And so Sonos, again, is asking the Court to strike the
```

word "particular." That doesn't belong there. It doesn't make any sense. It was a type -- woops. I'm sorry about that. It was a typographical error that was introduced during the prosecution history, and I'll show you why that's the case.

Again, this is the same -- woops. This is the same case that -- actually, let me shrink this down a little bit.

This is the same case that -- well, not the same case, but the same test that defendants have shown. The Court allowed to correct errors in the claim when two conditions are met: The correction is not subject to reasonable debate based on the consideration of the claim language and the specification -- I think that phrase is important -- and, two, the prosecution history does not suggest an alternative interpretation of the claims.

And both of those conditions are met here.

If we take a look at the prosecution history, in an Office Action Response filed in 2016, Your Honor, the applicant needed to identify -- needed to add a tag to identify playback device. And the word they chose was "particular." We see that in here Claim 1, underlined.

And in order to provide this antecedent in the rest of the claims, the applicant added the word "particular" in front of all the instances of playback device. And I've highlighted those in yellow in Claim 3 here on Slide 19.

But in doing so, it must have been a find-and-replace

error. They added particular playback -- they added the word "particular" in front of playback, but this was playback system and not playback device. There's -- that's clearly an error.

Again, "media particular playback system" is a phrase that doesn't make sense. You won't find that phrase in the specification, Your Honor.

There was no reason to distinguish -- or to provide any of the reasons that Google says -- or do any of the work that Google says this word does. There was no prior art reason that the applicant needed to do that. And actually, it's a little -- it's a little curious -- and again, apologies for the screen there.

It's a little curious that the applicant would need to do that for Claim 3 but not the other claims. I mean, this just further illustrates why this was a typo.

Dependent Claim 2, that you can see here, includes a very similar phrase, a very similar limitation here, "detecting a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to a zone of a media playback system," but here, the applicant did not insert the word "particular."

And so again, this is a claim that should -- these should be mirror images except for some other limitations that aren't really important. Particular here is just a stray word that was added accidentally.

And so again, we would request, rather than, you know, an

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extreme holding of indefiniteness, that the Court exercise its discretion to just strike this word that's clearly a typo.
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And I'm happy to answer any questions Your Honor might have, but also happy to pass the mic over to Mr. Jaffe.

THE COURT: Mr. Verhoeven, if you'll give me just one second. And it may be someone else, I know, but if y'all will give me just one second.

MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

THE COURT: Let me ask plaintiff's counsel, before I turn to counsel for Google: I -- as I just showed, I'm -- frankly, even though I was not a patent prosecutor and could never have qualified to be one, I am still somewhat sympathetic to that mistakes can be made; and if they really are just scrivener errors, they can be addressed by the Court, which is an efficient way of dealing with it.

But I'm having a hard time with this one, with the way this -- the way the amendments were made, how I could meet the standard I'm supposed to meet, that this was -- that this was a scrivener error.

I'm having a hard time with that. If you could help me one more time with that before I turn it over to Google's folks.

MR. RICHTER: Yeah. No. I'm happy to address that, Your
Honor.

The scrivener's error comes actually from the way that we look at how the amendments were made and the fact that the amendments being made on October 25th, 2016 were to insert the word "particular" before playback. And the fact that the applicant carried that through, you know, perhaps with a less than attentive, you know, attention to detail than we would've liked, they carried that through.

And that explains how you find the word "particular" in the wrong place, where it doesn't make any sense, and why, for instance, the applicant didn't add the word "particular" in response to the examiner saying, hey, you know, you've got a prior art problem here, applicant. You've got to add the word "particular" because that will distinguish from media systems that don't play MP3s, for example.

None of that is -- was in the record. None of that was in the file history. There was no reason -- no prior art reason to do this. And I think if you compare it to the other claims, that's why you see that this word is just a stray word.

And let me address just one more time the standard, and it's -- one, the correction's not subject to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm having a hard time following how that could be a stray word in this situation. I mean, it's -- I don't get that. I'm not -- when I say "I don't get it," I mean, it's not like when you speak in Mandarin, I don't get Mandarin. I mean, I'm saying here, I'm hearing your argument

and your argument doesn't make sense to me.

MR. RICHTER: Okay. No problem. Let me just take -- maybe we can walk through the amendment here and -- to show how it was erroneously inserted.

So the relevant portion of Claim 1 being amended in this Office Action Response was directed to this "detecting a set of inputs to transfer playback from the control device to a playback device." And what the applicant needed to do was insert a label here to identify the given -- or the individual playback device that it would reference throughout the remainder of Claim 1 and the rest of the amendments.

So the applicant had to add the word "particular" in front of playback device. And so the applicant did that.

Here you find another recitation of it.

And then in Claim 3, you see here every instance you've added the word "particular" to provide the antecedent that the applicant introduced in Claim 1.

So we have particular playback device, particular playback device, particular playback device, and finally particular playback device. But in red right here, it doesn't say particular playback device. They added the word "particular" in front of playback, but they forgot that it says "system" instead.

So adding the word "particular" here seems to be a result of attempting to provide antecedent basis back to what the

```
1
    applicant introduced here but just adding it in a place that it
    didn't need antecedent basis. And that -- and by doing so,
 2
 3
    kind of created this scrivener's error. Like, there was no
    reason to put the word "particular" in the phrase "media
 4
 5
    particular playback system." No prior art reason and, in fact,
 6
    no specification reason because the specification doesn't use
    that phrase.
 7
 8
         And, you know, (inaudible) that phrase doesn't even make
 9
    any sense. That's not how you would refer to a -- "media
    particular playback system," that just doesn't make sense.
10
11
         And so I think, you know, looking at the -- this
12
    amendment, the insertion of the word "particular" in this
13
    October 25th, 2016 response and then also comparing it here to
14
    other claims that recite virtually identical limitations that
15
    don't contain the word "particular" kind of demonstrates that
16
    this "particular" is a stray word. It should not have been
17
    Control V-d or pasted into that response, and we would
18
    respectfully request the Court to correct that.
19
         THE COURT: If you guys will give me a few seconds.
20
         (Pause in proceedings.)
                     I think -- I just don't think I have the power
21
         THE COURT:
22
    to do this. I think maybe the Patent Office does. But I don't
23
    think this is a scrivener's error. It may have been a mistake
24
    during the prosecution and maybe the Patent Office can address
25
    it through some manner they have, but I don't believe I can.
```

```
1
         I'm going to maintain the construction of it being
 2
    indefinite.
 3
         I think that's all the claim terms we have, isn't it?
         MR. JAFFE: Your Honor, this is Jordan Jaffe on behalf of
 4
 5
            We had one additional term that we wanted to raise,
 6
    which was the "instruction" phrase for the '033 patent.
 7
         THE COURT: Give me one second to find it. Oh, I got it.
 8
    I'm sorry I just -- that was my bad. I just missed it.
 9
    apologize.
10
         MR. JAFFE: No problem.
         Mr. Vaughan, if you don't mind putting up Slide 49 of our
11
12
    presentation.
13
         So this is in the '033 patent, which is part of the two
    patents that Sonos refers to as the "direct-play patents." And
14
15
    it's actually a longer phrase, and we've only excerpted here.
16
    But it's an instruction for at least one given playback device,
    and then it continues.
17
18
         And there's only one issue that Google is disputing here,
19
    which is whether the instruction, as written, has to be one
20
    instruction that performs the limitations of the claim or,
    according to Sonos, whether then it can have multiple
21
22
    instructions each performing part of the instruction that's
23
    claimed. And so let me explain what I mean by that.
2.4
         If we can go to Slide 50, please.
25
         So I've excerpted here Claim 1 of the '033 patent.
```

what I've highlighted in yellow here, which is again Claim 1, 1 is the longer phrase that we're asking for the construction. 2 3 And speaking broadly about what the claim is talking about here, just to set the context, is we're talking about a system 4 5 in which you are, you know, let's say, listening to music on 6 your phone or other sort of computing device and then you want 7 to transfer playback from your phone to a remote device, let's 8 say, a TV or a speaker of some kind. 9 And what the '033 patent talks about, again, broadly 10 speaking here, is "transmitting an instruction for the at least 11 one given playback device to take over responsibility for 12 playback of what it refers to as the remote playback queue." 13 So you're transferring playback responsibility from, let's say, the device you're holding in your hand to a remote 14 15 speaker. 16 And then further, it talks about this instruction performing these next few additional items. 17 18 So if we can go to the next slide, please. 19 So I've highlighted in blue here the two requirements that 20 are laid out for this instruction. The first requirement is 21 what I was just referring to, to "take over responsibility for 22 playback of the remote playback queue." But the claim continues, and this was also language that 23 24 was added during prosecution, where it talks about: Wherein

the instruction -- the instruction configures the at least one

25

given playback device to perform what we refer to as three subsets -- these three items listed here -- communicate, use the obtained data, and play back the retrieved at least one media item.

So again, what the claim is talking about here is transmitting an instruction that does, one, what the first red box here does, take over responsibility for playback of remote playback queue and, two, where the instruction, that instruction, configures the playback devices to perform these three substeps here.

And so our position is that "the instruction," there has to be one instruction that performs what's in these two boxes.

Again, this is not to say that you can't have several other instructions in a system. We're not trying to read out the comprising and the preamble. We're not saying that there can't be more instructions.

All we're saying is that there has to be one instruction that's transmitted, that takes over responsibility for playback, and configures the playback device to perform these three substeps. And we think there's Federal Circuit case law that's directly on point here.

If we can go to the next slide, please.

This is the Varma decision from 2016, which we cite in our briefing. In our briefing, we explained that this case was directly on point. And in the reply brief, Sonos didn't

mention it at all. So we think, at this point, it's undisputed that this is directly on point.

And just to compare what we're talking about in terms of this Varma decision to the claim language here, the decision in Varma is -- and I'm just going to read a bit here for context. It says: Here the question is not whether there can be more than one request in a claim-covered system: There can.

Rather, the question is whether "a" can serve to negate what is required by the claim language following "a": A "request" (singular term) that "correspond[s]" to "two or more selected investments." It cannot. For a dog owner to have "a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks," it does not suffice that he have two dogs, each able to perform one of the tasks.

And so we think that this is directly on point for our situation. And just to underline that point --

If we can go to the next slide, please.

-- what I've done here on this slide is taken the quote from Varma that we just went through, and we can just plug in the specific parts of the construction that we're talking about -- or excuse me -- the specific parts of the claim that we're talking about from the '033 patent.

Again, the language that I just read on the left-hand side, we can just plug it in on the right-hand side, and it's directly analogous to our position. And I'm just going to read that here: The question is whether "a" can serve to negate

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1
    what is required by the language following "a": A
 2
    ["instruction"] (singular term) that ["takes over
 3
    responsibility"] and ["configures" "the at least one playback
 4
    device" to perform these three substeps"]. It cannot.
         If we can go to the next slide.
 5
 6
         So here, we -- there has to be -- there can be a lot of
 7
    instructions, but there has to be an instruction that takes
 8
    over responsibility and performs these three substeps. So that
 9
    is the main point.
10
         So to use the more colloquial analogy, that the --
         THE COURT: If you'll give me just one second. I'm going
11
12
    to look at your...
13
         Okay. I'm good. Thank you.
         MR. JAFFE: Sure. So I was just going to go through the
14
15
    more colloquial example here from the Federal Circuit. We've
16
    got to have a dog that rolls over and fetches sticks. We can't
    have one dog that fetches sticks and one dog that rolls over.
17
18
         And that's the same thing that we're talking about here in
19
    our claim language. There has to been an instruction that
20
    takes over responsibility and configures the at least one
21
    playback device to perform these three substeps.
22
         And so that's -- this is directly on point to what we're
23
    talking about. We think it's clearly required by the claim
24
    language.
25
         If we can go to the next slide.
```

If there was any doubt that this was the right construction, we think that that doubt is removed by the prosecution history here. And in particular, the applicant, during prosecution, expressly distinguished prior art that used multiple messages or instructions here.

And I've excerpted here -- and this is Google's response brief, Exhibit 17 -- where they -- where the applicants distinguish the Gran reference. And they said, the problem with this Gran reference is it "must continuously direct the media-rendering device." That is, it must continually send these messages, as compared to them, which only transmitted an instruction.

But the applicant actually went even further and said, the problem with Gran is it doesn't transmit that instruction. It continuously directs the media device. But it also does not transmit such an instruction, singular, that configures the media-rendering device to perform these three substeps as recited in applicant's independent claims.

So we think that under the Varma decision and the plain language itself, it's clear that we have to have an instruction that does both of these tricks, so to speak, but we also think that to the extent that there's any doubt about that, it's removed by the express distinguishing of the Gran reference during prosecution.

And with that, Your Honor, I can conclude, unless Your

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Honor has any questions.
 1
                     I don't. I'll hear from plaintiff.
 2
         THE COURT:
 3
         MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. This is Dan Smith
    on behalf of Sonos. Let me just share my screen here.
 4
         Jordan, would you mind unsharing?
 5
 6
         Okay. Your Honor, can you see my presentation here?
         THE COURT:
 7
                     I can.
 8
         MR. SMITH: Okay. Great. And just, you know, I'm having
 9
    a hard time seeing it. Is it -- oh, you know what? Sorry.
10
         It looks like -- is that better now, the one that doesn't
    show the notes?
11
12
         THE COURT: Yes. That's fine by me.
13
         MR. SMITH: Okay. Okay. Great. Sorry about that.
         Okay, Your Honor. Yeah. So I would like to comment on a
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15
    number of things that Mr. Jaffe just raised. And, you know,
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    let's just jump in. I won't go through the whole claim term
17
    here, as he's already done that. I don't want to waste the
    Court's time.
18
19
         But, you know, I do want to start with the general rule
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    here. I don't think there's any dispute here that the general
21
    rule in claim construction is that an indefinite article "a" or
22
    "an" in an open-ended patent claim, such as we have here, means
23
    one or more.
24
         And while there are exceptions to this rule, the Federal
25
    Circuit has made clear that those exceptions are extremely
```

limited.

And here you can see I have an excerpt from the Baldwin Graphic case, and it states exactly that. And then at the end of that excerpt, it goes on to say, you know: An exception to the general rule means that -- or excuse me -- only arises where the language of the claims, the specification, or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule.

As I'm going to walk you through here in a few moments, that's just not the case here with the '033 patent.

So first, Your Honor, I just want to -- what Google appears to be doing is, right, they're kind of conflating two separate, you know, limitations in this claim term. The first is what I've highlighted here in red.

And this is the portion of the claim that recites what the instruction is, right? It's "an instruction for the at least one given playback device to take over responsibility for playback of the remote playback queue from the computing device." And that is what the instruction is.

And notably, this instruction does not specify the exact number of instructions that can be transmitted, right? It doesn't say a single instruction, it doesn't say one instruction. It doesn't state what the exact contents of that instruction is, and I'll get to that in a moment because I think that's really what Google wants to do, is they want to import kind of what's in the next "wherein" clause into what

the instruction is. It doesn't do that.

Also, Your Honor, you know, it just doesn't say exactly how that instruction is transmitted. It doesn't say it's transmitted directly to, you know, the playback device or any other device.

So when you look at that, Your Honor, and you apply the general rule, we think it's very clear here that "an instruction" means one or more instructions.

But let's look at the "wherein" clause, which is really where Google has focused a lot of its intention here. And here the "wherein" clause states: Wherein the instruction configures the at least one given playback device to do three different functions.

And so again, just to be clear, that's talking about functions that the playback device is to perform after the instruction is transmitted. That's not talking about functions that are three separate elements or directions that must be included in the instruction itself, let alone a single instruction.

And that's really -- Google appears to be kind of blurring those two lines together and saying, well, these three functions and the "wherein" clause really need to be part of the instruction itself, and that's just not the case.

And, Your Honor, what I find ironic here is, Google has been -- you know, harped about, well, they didn't directly

address this case that's on point. But Sonos, in fact, cited a case -- a Federal Circuit case in its brief that's just as relevant and, in fact, we believe more relevant than the case that Google cited, and that's the Convolve case. And we would encourage the Court to look at that case.

But in the Convolve case, the term at issue was "a processor" that executes certain process steps, and then it lists three steps, believe it or not, with Roman Numerals I, II and III. In that case the Federal Circuit found that this term was not limited to a single processor despite the plurality of required "process steps" executed "a processor."

Sonos' construction. And not only that, Your Honor, here again, as I just mentioned, it's not the instruction of Claim 1 that even performs or executes those three functions, instead it's playback device. The instruction configures the playback device to do that.

So again, Your Honor, we believe that this Convolve case is on point. Google hasn't addressed this case.

Just to be clear, I just want to make sure it's clear to everybody, I mean, this is exactly what the claim says. This is Claim 9, one of the claims at issue in Convolve, talks about a processor which executes the process steps so as Roman Numeral I, II and III. And again, the Court found that that wasn't limited to a single processor, could have one or more

processors to execute those three functions.

So, Your Honor, let's next -- if we go back to the Baldwin case, it says there are exceptions, they're rare. You got to look for whether the claims, the spec or the prosecution history necessitate a departure from the rule. And we just went through the claims. Clearly they don't necessitate a departure from the rule.

Let's turn to the spec. Google fails to identify any disclosure in the specification that supports its attempt to limit an instruction to a single instruction. And, in fact, the specification does not limit -- does not place a limit, excuse me, on the number of instructions.

So now I want to turn to the prosecution history here, which Google, you know, addressed. And we believe that Google has mischaracterized the prosecution history, and we would encourage the Court to take a look at that Sonos response that's been cited in full.

But in sum here, as you heard Google just argue, and they did the same thing in their response brief, Google argued that Sonos distinguished the Gran reference because it required transmitting multiple continuous instructions rather than a single instruction to take over playback responsibility. And we believe that that's a mischaracterization.

Instead, as we explained in our brief, and I think what you'll see if you look at the response in full, while Sonos did

identify some teachings of Gran, including this continuous instruction, at the end of that, Sonos concluded that -- and, excuse me, distinguished Gran because the media-rendering device in Gran never takes over responsibility for playback of a remote playback queue from the control Element 100 regardless of the number of instructions.

Sonos never said that our claims require a single instruction to take over responsibility and Gran required multiple instruction. That just -- that's just not there, and that's just a mischaracterization that we believe Google is asserting here.

And this is the -- you know, the majority of the argument here. It goes through some teachings of Gran at the top. And then, again, these teachings confirm that Gran never takes over responsibility, not about whether it's one instruction or multiple instructions.

And, Your Honor, what I think is telling here is Google's argument is kind of based on this false premise that Gran discloses multiple instructions for taking over playback responsibility and that, again, Sonos distinguished those multiple instructions based on the claims requiring a single. And that, again, is just not the case.

And if you look at what Sonos -- how Sonos described Gran and if you were to read that reference and the portion cited in the response here, you'll see that the continuous instructions

in Gran direct the media-rendering device of Gran to continue playing subsequent files in the device queue that the media-rendering device itself is already playing.

So there's nothing disclosed here in Sonos' response that would tell you Gran -- in Gran that the control point, which is the controller here, that that is playing audio from the queue and then these instructions are causing the media-rendering device, which is the playback device, to take over responsibility. That's just not there.

I mean, there's nothing to take over. All this discloses here is that the controller manages the queue, not that it's playing the queue, and that it directs the media-rendering device to continue playing that queue. Keep playing the next song. You're already playing the queue, play the next song and the next song and so forth.

So, you know, one last thing, Your Honor, I'd just like to point out. And, you know, this is about, you know, Google's lead case which you heard about, the in re Varma case. You know, the claim language is a lot different from, for example, the Convolve case and the claims that are at issue here.

In Varma the term at issue was "a statistical analysis request corresponding to two or more selected investments."

Obviously the claims here don't have that corresponding language. You may have seen Google tried to cut

"corresponding" out and (inaudible) some language from the '033

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patent claims. But at the end of the day the '033 patent claims do not use this term "corresponding."
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In this Varma case the Federal Circuit obviously construed this term to mean "a single request that must correspond to at least two investments." But, again, it did so in part based on the claims which we believe the language is significantly different here. But also the prosecution history was very clear there. The patentee had amended the claims to include this limitation, and then distinguish the art based on the fact that the claims required a single analysis request corresponding to multiple selected investments.

So, Your Honor, I'll stop there unless you have questions.

I can pass it back to Mr. Jaffe.

THE COURT: No. I'll hear from defendant.

MR. JAFFE: Thank you. If we can get our slides back up.

And if we can go back TO Slide 52, please.

So the first issue that I want to address is to really clarify what Google is asking for and what it's not asking for here. Google is not asking where we have claim language that says "an instruction." There can be more than one instruction. We are not trying to override the "an instruction" that is listed there. That's not what we're doing. And that's, again, expressly parallel to what we're talking about in the Varma case.

What we are arguing is that Sonos cannot negate what is

required by the language following it. Again, expressly parallel to what we were talking about in the Varma decision here.

If we can go to Slide 51, please.

So mapping this to the claim language where, in the yellow here which is Claim 1 of the '033, it says "an instruction."

We're not saying there can't be lots of instructions. What we are saying is that Sonos cannot override the language that follows the instruction and describes what the instruction is.

That they cannot override that language, that the language itself says there must be an instruction for the at least one given playback device -- excuse me -- to take over responsibility, and then further where it says "wherein the instruction configures the at least one given playback device to."

Now, counsel for Sonos was suggesting that these three substeps were capabilities of the playback device. But I think just reading the plain language, we can see this is a further limitation on the instruction it expressly says -- and this is in between the two red blocks here in Claim 1 of the '033 on my slide -- "wherein the instruction configures the at least one given playback device."

So, again, we are not asking for anything other than what the claim language itself provides. While Sonos, on the other hand, is asking to override the claim language and make it so

2.4

that they can read out the requirements on what the instructions are here. And we think that that's improper under the Federal Circuit cases that we've cited to.

Counsel for Sonos mentioned the Convolve decision as on point. I think if Your Honor looks at that decision, you'll see that there are actually two findings in that decision. One is the Court finds that "a processor" not limited, and that's what counsel for Sonos mentioned.

But if you actually read on in the decision, they -- the Federal Circuit in that case looked at a different set of claims, and they found that it was limited.

And if you look at the difference between the two language -- the claim language in those two cases or -- excuse me -- those two claims within the same case, you can see that in our situation the '033 patent is actually parallel to the situation in Convolve, where the Federal Circuit did find it was limited to a single processor.

And I'm just going to read from the relevant part of the Convolve decision, which is 812 F.3d 1313. And it says: Given this claim language, which contrasts with the claims described above that allow for multiple processors, we conclude that Claims 1, 3 and 5 require the user interface to work with a single processor in performing all the claimed steps.

And so here we have the same situation, where the claim language does not allow for multiple instructions that perform

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these steps. It expressly requires that there -- the instruction configures the three substeps and that same instruction takes over responsibility.
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So even under the decision that they're kind of championing now, this Convolve decision, it supports Google's position that they cannot read out the express requirements of the instruction by using the kind of modifier "an" at the beginning.

And then on the last item, counsel went through the prosecution history in some detail. I think, you know, I went through that before, basically that they aren't addressing the specific parts of the file history that I quoted. They're only quoting the end part and not the specific parts I quoted above.

But unless Your Honor has any additional questions, that's it for me.

THE COURT: I don't.

17 Any response?

MR. SMITH: Yeah, Your Honor. Just two points.

On the most recent point Mr. Jaffe just raised about Sonos not addressing the prosecution history he pointed to, I think that's incorrect. We -- again, I can direct you to the slide if you'd like, but we expressly address the language where Sonos talked about the continuous instructions in Gran. So I think that was a mischaracterization.

Second, you know, he pointed you to some other portion of

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    Convolve that he says is more on point. I would encourage you
    to look at that. You'll see that the claims and the issue that
 2
 3
    I addressed with the Court, those are the ones that are most
 4
    analogous to the claim at issue here, and there were other
 5
    reasons why the Court limited the different claims in the way
 6
    that they did.
 7
         That's all I have, Your Honor.
 8
         THE COURT: I'll be back in a few seconds.
 9
         (Pause in proceedings.)
10
         THE COURT: If we can go back on the record.
11
         The Court is going to maintain its construction of plain
12
    and ordinary meaning.
13
         I'll ask -- anyone can answer this: Have we set a trial
14
    date for this case?
15
         MR. SIEGMUND: Yes, Your Honor. I believe we have.
                                                               I'm
16
    looking right now at the scheduling order.
17
         Your Honor, it's June 6th.
         THE COURT: Very good. Okay. Is there anything else we
18
19
    need to take up?
20
         MR. SIEGMUND: Nothing from plaintiff, Your Honor.
21
         THE COURT: Very good. I've got two more -- I have two
22
    more Markmans today. I doubt they'll be of this stellar
23
    quality, but this was a great way to start the morning. Maybe
2.4
    I'll figure out how to do these, you know, by the end of the
25
    year.
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So I very much appreciate the quality of the lawyers
 1
    today, and I look forward to having you in trial next June.
 2
    Hopefully I'll see some of you soon. Take care.
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          (Hearing adjourned at 12:06 p.m.)
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1
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT )
 2
    WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
 3
         I, Kristie M. Davis, Official Court Reporter for the
 4
 5
    United States District Court, Western District of Texas, do
    certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the
 6
 7
    record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
 8
         I certify that the transcript fees and format comply with
 9
    those prescribed by the Court and Judicial Conference of the
10
    United States.
         Certified to by me this 11th day of August 2021.
11
12
                                  /s/ Kristie M. Davis
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